Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects by Gergely Csorba
MŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
MT￿DP. 2004/14
SCREENING CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE
OF POSITIVE NETWORK EFFECTS
GERGELY  CSORBA
Institute of Economics
 Hungarian Academy of Sciences
BudapestMŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
2004/14
SCREENING CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE
OF POSITIVE NETWORK EFFECTS
GERGELY  CSORBA
  Budapest
August 2004KTK/IE Discussion Papers 2004/14
Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences
KTK/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque
comments. Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is
preliminary. Materials published in this series may subject to further publication.
The paper selected for the 4
th Budapest Summer Workshop for young economists,
organised by the KTI/IE on 29–30 June 2004.
The Budapest Summer Workshops intend to bring together young economists with
foreign PhD education, frequently still working or studying abroad.
Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects
Author: Gergely CSORBA, PhD student. Postal address: Central European
University, Economics Department, H–1051 Budapest, Nádor. u.
9. Phone: (36+1) 327-3020 Fax: (36+1) 327-3232 E-mail address:
cphcsg@phd.ceu.hu
The author is very much indepted to Peter Benczur for his detailed comments, and thanks
to Attila Ambrus, Russell Cooper and Patrick Rey for usefull discussions, as well seminar
participants at the 2003 Villa Mondragone Workshop in Rome and the 2003 Economic
Society European Meeting in Stockholm.
HU ISSN 1785-377X
ISBN 963 9588 13 X
Published by the Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2004.
With financial support from the Hungarian Economic FoundationThe Publications of the Institute of Economics
BUDAPEST WORKING PAPERS BUDAPESTI
ON THE LABOUR MARKET MUNKAGAZDAS`GTANI F￿ZETEK
 BWP 2003/1 `gnes HÆrs Channeled East-West labour migration in the frame of bilateral
agreements
 BWP 2003/2 Galasi PØter MunkanØlk￿lisØgi indikÆtorok Øs az ÆllÆsnØlk￿liek munkaerő-piaci
k￿tődØse
 BWP 2003/3 KÆroly Fazekas Effects of foreign direct investment on the performance of local
labour markets ￿ The case of Hungary
 BWP 2003/4 PØter Galasi Estimating wage equations for Hungarian higher-education graduates
 BWP 2003/5 PØter Galasi Job-training of Hungarian higher-education graduates
 BWP 2003/6 GÆbor Kertesi and
JÆnos K￿llő
The Employment Effects of Nearly Doubling  the Minimum Wage ￿
The Case of Hungary
 BWP 2003/7 Nemes-Nagy J. ￿
NØmeth N.
A "hely" Øs a "fej". A regionÆlis tagoltsÆg tØnyezői az ezredfor-
dul￿ MagyarorszÆgÆn
 BWP 2003/8 Jœlia Varga The Role of Labour Market Expectations and Admission Probabilities
in Students’ Application Decisions on Higher Education: the case of
Hungary
 BWP 2004/1 GÆbor Kertesi The Employment of the Roma ￿ Evidence from Hungary
 BWP 2004/2 KØzdi GÆbor Az akt￿v foglalkoztatÆspolitikai programok hatÆsvizsgÆlatÆnak m￿d-
szertani kØrdØsei
 BWP 2004/3 Galasi PØter Val￿ban leØrtØkelődtek a felsőfokœ diplomÆk? A munkahelyi k￿vetel-
mØnyek vÆltozÆsa Øs a felsőfokœ vØgzettsØgű munkavÆllal￿k
reallokÆci￿ja MagyarorszÆgon 1994￿2002
 BWP 2004/4 Galasi PØter TœlkØpzØs, alulkØpzØs Øs bØrhozam a magyar munkaerőpiacon
1994￿2002
RESEARCH IN LABOUR ECONOMICS
(Volumes based on conferences organised by KTK/IE and the Labour Science Committee HAS)
Munkaerőpiac Øs regionalitÆs az Ætmenet időszakÆban.  Budapest, 1998.                      Ed.: K. Fazekas
A munka￿gyi kapcsolatok rendszere Øs a munkavÆllal￿k helyzete.  Budapest, 2000.                    Ed.: J.
Koltay
OktatÆs Øs munkaerőpiaci ØrvØnyes￿lØs.  Budapest, 2001.                                                          Ed.: A.
SemjØn
A felzÆrk￿zÆs esØlyei ￿ Munkapiaci lÆtlelet a felzÆrk￿zÆs k￿sz￿bØn. Budapest, 2003.      Ed.: Gy. KővÆri
LABOUR MARKET YEARBOOKS
Munkaerőpiaci t￿k￿r ￿ 2000. Budapest, 2000. Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci t￿k￿r ￿ 2001. Budapest, 2001. Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci t￿k￿r ￿ 2002. Budapest, 2002. Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci t￿k￿r ￿ 2003. Budapest, 2003. Ed.: K. Fazekas
The Hungarian Labour Market ￿ Review and Analysis, 2002. Bp., 2002 Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Koltay
The Hungarian Labour Market ￿ Review and Analysis, 2003. Bp., 2003 Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Koltay
Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market is jointly published by the Labour
Research Department, Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the
Department of Human Resources, Budapest University of Economics and Public Admini-
stration. Copies are available from: Ms. IrØn Szab￿, Department of Human Resources, Buda-
pest University of Economics, and Public Administration. H￿1093 Budapest, FővÆm tØr 8.
Phone/fax: 36-1 217-1936 E-mail: iszabo@bkae.hu; Ms. Zsuzsa SÆndor, Library of the Institute
of Economics, H￿1502 Budapest P.O. Box 262, Fax: 36-1 309-2649; E-mail:
biblio@econ.core.hu. Papers can be downloaded from the homepage of the Institute of Eco-
nomics: http://econ.core.huDISCUSSION PAPERS New Series MŰHELYTANULM`NYOK ￿j sorozat
MT￿DP. 2003/1 NACSA BeÆta ￿ SERES
Antal
Az Øves munkaidő-elszÆmolÆs, mint a munkaidő flexi-
bilizÆci￿jÆnak egyik eszk￿ze
MT￿DP. 2003/2 Giovanni PERI ￿ Dieter
URBAN
The Veblen-Gerschenkorn Effect of FDI in Mezzo-
giorno and East Germany
MT￿DP. 2003/3 Robin MASON ￿ `kos
VALENTINYI
Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in
Interaction Games
MT￿DP. 2003/4 M.B. DEVEREUX ￿ C. ENGEL
￿ P.E. STORGAARD
Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through when
Nominal Prices are Set in Advance
MT￿DP. 2003/5 Richard FRIBERG Common Currency, Common Market?
MT￿DP. 2003/6 David C. PARSLEY￿
Shang-Jin  WEI
The Micro-foundations of Big Mac Real Exchange
Rates
MT￿DP. 2003/7 J.IMBS ￿ H. MUMTAZ ￿
M.O. RAVN ￿ H. REY
PPP Strikes Back: Aggregation and the Real Ex-
change Rate
MT￿DP. 2003/8 A. BURSTEIN ￿M. EICH-
ENBAUM ￿ S. REBELO
Why is inflation so low after large devaluations?
MT￿DP. 2003/9 MAJOROS Krisztina A mœlt szÆzad jeles magyar k￿zgazdÆsza: Varga Ist-
vÆn (1897￿1962)
MT￿DP. 2003/10 KOV`CS Ilona A fogyaszt￿i Ærindex torz￿t￿ tØnyezői
MT￿DP. 2003/11 MÆria CSAN`DI￿Hairong
LAI
Transformation of the Chinese party-state at prefecture
and county level
MT￿DP. 2003/12 Ilona KOV`CS Biasing Factors of the Consumer Price Index
MT￿DP. 2003/13 Attila HAVAS Socio-Economic and Developmental Needs: Focus
of Foresight Programmes
MT￿DP. 2004/1 Attila HAVAS Assessing the Impact of Framework Programmes in a
System in Transition
MT￿DP. 2004/2 Max GILLMAN￿Michal
KEJAK
Inflation and Balanced-Path Growth with Alternative
Payment Mechanisms
MT￿DP. 2004/3 L. AMBRUS-LAKATOS￿
B. VIL`GI￿J. VINCZE
Deviations from interest rate parity in small open
economies: a quantitative-theoretical investigation
MT￿DP. 2004/4 HALPERN LÆszl￿ Øs
szerzőtÆrsai
A minimÆlbØr k￿ltsØgvetØsi hatÆsai
MT￿DP. 2004/5 FALUV￿GI Albert A tÆrsadalmi-gazdasÆgi jellemzők ter￿leti alakulÆsa
Øs vÆrhat￿ hatÆsai az Ætmenet időszakÆban
MT￿DP. 2004/6 MÆria CSAN`DI Budget constraints in party-states nested in power rela-
tions: the key to different paths of transformation
MT￿DP. 2004/7 MÆria CSAN`DI A comparative model of party-states: the structural
reasons behind similarities and differences in self-
reproduction, reforms and transformation
MT￿DP. 2004/8 KARSAI Judit Helyettes￿theti-e az Ællam a magÆntőke-befektetőket?
Az Ællam szerepe a magÆntőke-piacon
MT￿DP. 2004/9 Judit KARSAI Can the state replace private capital investors? Public
financing of venture capital in Hungary
MT￿DP. 2004/10 MÆria CSAN`DI Do party-states transform by learning? The structural
background of the different transformation paths in
view of the Romanian, Hungarian and Chinese cases
MT￿DP. 2004/11 IstvÆn CZAJLIK ￿ JÆnos
VINCZE
Corporate law and corporate governance. The
Hungarian experience
MT￿DP. 2004/12 L. HALPERN et al Firms￿ Price Markups and Returns to Scale in
Imperfect Markets: Bulgaria and Hungary
MT￿DP. 2004/13 Norbert MAIER Explaining Corruption: A Common Agency Approach
Copies of both series are available from Ms. Zsuzsa SÆndor, Library of Institute of Economics
H￿1502 Budapest P.O.Box 262 Fax: (36-1) 309-2649 E-mail: biblio@econ.core.hu. Papers
can be downloaded from the homepage of the Institute of Economics: http://econ.core.huMŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
MT￿DP. 2004/14




Based on the critical assumption of strategic complementarity, this
paper builds a general model to describe and solve the screening
problem faced by the monopolist seller of a network good. By applying
monotone comparative static tools, we demonstrate that the joint
presence of asymmetric information and positive network effects leads
to a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities
provided. We also show that the equilibrium allocation is an increasing
function of the intensity of network effects, and that a discriminating
monopoly may supply large quantities for all consumers than a
competitive industry.
Keywords: network effects, strategic complementarities, contracting
with externalities, second-degree discrimination, monotone compa-
rative statics
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CSORBA GERGELY
SZEPAR`L￿ SZERZŐD￿SMEN￿K H`L￿ZATI HAT`SOK MELLETT
Összefoglalás
A tanulmÆny egy ÆltalÆnos modellt Øp￿t fel a stratØgiai kiegØsz￿tősØg
kulcsfeltØtelØre, Øs ￿gy ￿rja le, oldja meg egy hÆl￿zati j￿szÆgot eladni k￿-
vÆn￿ monop￿lium szűrØsi problØmÆjÆt. Monoton komparat￿v statikai
eszk￿z￿k alkalmazÆsÆval belÆtjuk, hogy az aszimmetrikus informÆci￿ Øs
a pozit￿v hÆl￿zati hatÆsok egy￿ttes jelenlØte oda vezet, hogy a (first-
best) optimÆlis mennyisØgek minden fogyaszt￿ esetØben lefelØ torzul-
nak. Ezen fel￿l megmutatjuk, hogy az egyensœlyi allokÆci￿ monoton n￿-
vekvő f￿ggvØnye a hÆl￿zati hatÆsok intenzitÆsÆnak, illetve hogy egy
diszkriminÆl￿ monopolista akÆr minden fogyaszt￿ szÆmÆra nagyobb
mennyisØget k￿nÆlhat, mint egy t￿kØletesen versenyző iparÆg.1 Introduction
This paper derives a general model of second-degree discrimination in the pres-
ence of positive network eﬀects. Positive network eﬀects are also called strate-
gic complementarities in consumption, and are present if an economic agent’s
utility derived from the consumption of the good is positively aﬀected by the
consumption level (or number) of other agents consuming the same or compat-
ible products.1 These eﬀects commonly arise in various modern industries, like
telecommunications, hardware and software or banking, and these industries are
similar in the following properties: they are highly concentrated and the ﬁrms
use a wide variety of nonlinear tariﬀs or very detailed contracts. Our goal in
this paper is to use the tools of monotone comparative statics to describe the
screening problem faced by a monopolist seller of a network good, and to give
a complete characterization of the optimal contracts it can use.
We build a unifying framework to examine two well-known results, which are
usually referred separately in the analysis of network economics. The ﬁrst is one
of the main conclusions in second-degree discrimination models, namely that the
incentive problem due to information asymmetry makes the monopoly distort
the quantity supplied to consumers with smaller willingness to pay for the good,
but makes ‘no distortion at the top’: consumers with the largest willingness to
pay are provided with the ﬁrst-best optimal quantities.2 The second result
is due to the externality literature: once a consumer’s utility is not only the
function of his own consumption level, but of the others’ consumption levels as
well, then in equilibrium all economic agents end up with socially suboptimal
quantities.3 Network eﬀects, which are generally assumed to be positive, result
in underconsumption of the network good for all consumers.
1For the implications of strategic complementarities on the production side (positive pro-
duction externalities) in principal-agent models, see Lockwood (2000).
2The seminal results of the second-degree discrimination literature were derived by Mussa
and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), summarized for example in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
3For a general overview on externalities, see for example Laﬀont (1988).
2The main aim of this paper is to show that if asymmetric information and
positive network eﬀects are both present, these two impacts reinforce each other,
so there will be a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities
provided. We also ﬁnd that despite the downward distorting impact of posi-
tive network eﬀects, the equilibrium outcome is an increasing function of the
intensity of the network eﬀects, no matter which type of discrimination we con-
sider. The ﬁrst result is a theoretical contribution to the literature on optimal
screening, and together with the second it has important implications for op-
timal pricing policies in network economies. Last, we show that in some cases
the discriminating monopoly supplies larger quantities for all consumers than
a perfectly competitive industry, which result may be relevant for regulatory
economics in these industries.
Let us demonstrate the strict downward distortion result by a simple exam-
ple. Suppose there are only two consumers of a network good, let us call them
sophisticated and normal. Assume that the sophisticated consumer beneﬁts
more both from his individual consumption and from network size, where the
latter is now identiﬁed as total consumption level. Whenever the monopoly is
capable of perfectly discriminating between the two consumers, it grasps both
consumers’ surplus and supplies the welfare-maximizing quantities. However,
when the monopoly is restricted to oﬀer the same menu of contracts to both
consumers, standard incentive theory tells us that it should distort the quantity
devoted to the normal consumer downwards in order to make switching less at-
tractive to the sophisticated consumer. Now if the normal consumer’s quantity
decreases, so does network size, and since positive network eﬀects are present,
the sophisticated consumer’s utility from his individual consumption is nega-
tively aﬀected. Thus, it is no more feasible to oﬀer him the ﬁrst-best optimal
quantity, and his consumption should be distorted downwards as well.
Before starting with the main model, we brieﬂy discuss the related literature.
The “old literature” on network eﬀects, which was basically on telecommuni-
cation pricing, focused on the question whether the network size would be the
3one that maximizes social welfare.4 It was found that in perfect competition
the network eﬀects cannot be fully internalized, and a monopoly may perform
better, since it controls both the price and the quantity, and may use cross-
subsidization policies more eﬀectively.5 Our analysis reinforces the result that
the perfectly discriminating monopoly always supplies larger quantities for all
consumers than a perfectly competitive industry, since it may set the socially
optimal allocation and reap the increased surplus of each consumer. However,
the comparison of second-best discrimination and perfect competition alloca-
tions does not give unambiguous results, since we are comparing two outcomes
that fail to be the ﬁrst-best for two diﬀerent reasons: incentive problems due to
information asymmetry and the incapability of internalizing network eﬀects.
The “new literature” on network eﬀects considered mainly homogeneous
types of consumers and concentrated on the multiple equilibria problem created
by diﬀerent (rational) expectations.6 Models with heterogeneous types of con-
sumers were only recently used by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Ellison and
Fudenberg (2001). However, these models analyze the eﬀectiveness of dynamic
strategies, like entry deterrence or software upgrades, in the presence of network
eﬀects, hence they concentrate on intertemporal discrimination aspects. Hahn
(2003) builds a special model of telecommunication to examine the role of call
and network externalities in nonlinear pricing. He establishes the result that in
equilibrium all types end up with suboptimal quantities, so the ‘no distortion
on the top’ result does not hold. Nevertheless, since he works with a special
utility structure, he attributes this result to the existence of call externalities.
Two works closely related to ours are Segal (1999, 2003), which develop a
4Seminal papers include Rohlfs (1974), Littlechild (1975) and Oren et al. (1982). This
classiﬁcation between the old and new literature on network eﬀects is based on Liebowitz and
Margolis (2002).
5Similar conclusions have been derived in the macroeconomics literature on imperfect com-
petition, for example in Cooper and John (1988, p. 454): “a demand externality may arise,
though, in market structures where agents require information on both prices and quantities
in making choices [...] In these cases quantities matter to individual decision makers, and
prices do not completely decentralize allocations”.
6Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) were the ﬁrst to raise this problem.
4general model of contracting with externalities and characterize the nature of
the arising ineﬃciencies. When externalities are positive, Segal shows that each
agent’s consumption level is smaller in the resulting equilibrium allocation than
in the socially eﬃcient one. Strategic complementarity is identiﬁed as the factor
accounting for this general feature;7 however, the analysis names two additional
assumptions that are useful in identifying the direction of distortions: ﬁrst,
the consumers are identical (hence there are no information asymmetries), and
second, total welfare depends only on aggregate trade, and not on its allocation
across consumers.8
This paper shows that the underconsumption result holds without these sim-
plifying assumptions if externalities are positive. In our model consumers are
heterogenous in two respects: ﬁrst, they have diﬀerent (exogenously given) val-
uations towards the same menus, and second, depending on their (endogenous)
choices, they may have diﬀerent valuations for the same network.9 This setting
can be applied both to networks where the agents are screened by the diﬀerent
consumption or usage level (such as in telecommunication), and to networks
where agents have unit demand for the good and are screened by the quality of
the service (such as in software markets).
Strategic complementarity, which is an inherent characteristic of positive
network eﬀects, is the “critical assumption” in the terminology of Milgrom and
Roberts (1994) that drives our results. It allows us to characterize the optimal
contracts in a general setting by applying monotone comparative static tools,
pioneered by Topkis (1978) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). The main ad-
vantage of our approach is that instead of solving the model explicitly for the
diﬀerent ﬁrst- and second-best allocations, it gives a simple method to compare
the equilibrium allocations. We develop a parametrized functional form that
encompasses both regime as optimal solutions for diﬀerent parameter values,
7Segal (1999, p. 356) names this key property “increasing externality”.
8Segal (1999, p. 341).
9The second property works for the other direction as well: diﬀerent networks sizes result
in diﬀerent marginal utilities of the same individual consumption for diﬀerent consumers.
5and then show that the optimal solution is a strictly monotone function of this
parameter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main
setup of the model, then Section 3 presents the benchmark case of ﬁrst-best
discrimination. In Section 4 we turn to the implementation of an incentive-
compatible menu of contracts, and characterize the second-best optimal contract
in the presence of positive network eﬀects. Section 5 compares the outcomes
of the two previous sections and analyzes further comparative statics questions.
Since monotone comparative static tools can be more suitably used for sets of
ﬁnite dimensions, the main model is built for a discrete distribution of types.
In Section 6 we brieﬂy discuss the continuous type case. Finally, Section 7
concludes and discusses the possible extensions of the model.
2 The model
Consider a monopoly that produces a good exhibiting positive network eﬀects
at a constant marginal cost c. We assume that the network goods sold to the
consumers are perfectly compatible with each other. Consumers have heteroge-
nous preferences for the good, a consumer of type θi is assumed to have a utility
function of
U(θi) = θiV (qi,q) − ti,




the total amount of network good in the economy (network size), and ti is the
tariﬀ charged for qi by the monopoly.
Suppose there are n diﬀerent types of consumers, so that θ1 < θ2 < ... < θn,
and let N denote the set of diﬀerent types. Consumer types are independently
distributed by a given cumulative distribution function F(θ), and this distribu-
tion function is common knowledge for all consumers and the monopoly. We
assume that there is a continuum of consumers in each type, so a single con-
sumer’s contribution to the network is negligible.
6Suppose that there are no externalities on non-traders: for all q,V (0,q) = 0,
so the outside option is zero for all consumers.10 However, we do not restrict
our analysis to pure network goods, i.e. the stand-alone utility V (q,0) may
diﬀer from 0. We assume that V (·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and that
V1 > 0 and V11 ≤ 0, so the marginal utility of individual consumption level is
positive and decreasing.11
The positivity of network eﬀects is captured by the following two key as-
sumptions. First, V2 > 0, so the marginal utility of network size is always
positive. Second, the consumption levels of each consumer groups are strategic
complements, which is equivalent of stating that V (·) has increasing diﬀerences
on (qi,q−i).12 These two assumptions together imply that individual consump-
tion and network size are strategic complements as well, thus V12 ≥ 0.13
Three remarks are in order. First, instead of the classical quantity discrim-
ination approach, we could give another interpretation of this problem, where
consumers have unit demands for the network good, and the goods diﬀer in
their quality qi. If in this case we normalize the mass of consumers to 1, q
can be seen as average quality level in the network. Second, this functional
form reﬂects the case as well, where each consumer looks at the usage levels of
diﬀerent packages as perfect substitutes in the network size, but gives a higher
weight to the packages similar to his own. Formally, this would mean that
qi = αq(θi)f(θi) + β
P
j6=i
q(θj)f(θj), where α > β. However, we can rewrite qi as
10This property ensures that consumers’ reservation value is type-independent. See Jullien
(2000) for a general model presenting the complications arising from type-dependent reserva-
tion values.
11In all of this paper, lower indexes refer to partial derivatives of the function V (·) in its
respective argument. Second, the words increasing (decreasing) and bigger (smaller) are used
in the weak sense.
12A function g(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) if g(x,t0) − g(x,t) is increasing in x
for all t0 > t.
13Note that the strategic complementarity of group consumption levels is a stronger as-
sumption, since it also captures that if a consumer’s individual consumption level increases
to q0
i, the same will happen in equilibrium for all type-i consumers, therefore network size
changes as well (technically speaking, it is a total derivative instead of a partial one).
7(α − β)q(θi)f(θi) + q, where α − β > 0, and then an appropriate modiﬁcation
of the original V (·) function will capture this case as well, and satisfy the as-
sumptions given above. Third, we have chosen constant marginal costs only for
expositional simplicity. Our qualitative results remain unchanged if we allow for
a cost function exhibiting weak cost complementarities (or so called economies
of scope), a property that generally ﬁts the structure of network industries.14
The timing of the model is the following. First, the monopoly oﬀers a menu
of contracts {(qi,ti)}n
i=1, among which consumers will self-select. Second, con-
sumers observe all possible contracts, and form their expectations about the
network size q. Finally, each consumer decides which package to purchase or
buys nothing, and payoﬀs are made.
We require that consumers’ expectations are rational, so they should be ful-
ﬁlled in equilibrium. However, we should also deﬁne an equilibrium selection
criterion, since as many models with network eﬀects show, consumers’ expecta-
tions about others’ choices crucially inﬂuence their behavior, which may result
in multiple equilibria. In our model the consumers’ individual consumption lev-
els are strategic complements, which induces a so-called supermodular game, so
there will be a (rationally expected) equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the oth-
ers.15 We assume that once the monopoly oﬀers the menu of contracts {(q,t)},
consumers coordinate on this equilibrium. Milgrom and Roberts (1996) give
a further justiﬁcation to concentrate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium by
showing that it is the only coalition-proof (correlated) equilibrium under any
admissible coalition communication structure.
14This is because weak cost complementarities imply a submodular cost function, as shown
by Sharkey (1982). It is also a suﬃcient condition for the ﬁrm being a natural monopoly.
15See Theorem 7 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
83 The ﬁrst-best optimal contract
As a benchmark case, suppose that the monopoly knows each consumer’s type,
and based on this information it can oﬀer personalized contracts to them. Then
the contracts will be designed such that in equilibrium each type realizes non-
negative utility, that is
θiV (qi,q) − ti ≥ 0 (Pi)
for all i ∈ N. Since the distribution function is common knowledge, each con-









and it has to be maximized such that participation constraints (Pi) are satisﬁed.
Naturally, all constraints will be binding in optimum, so the optimal quantity
schedule determines the optimal tariﬀ schedule. Therefore, the key decision
variable for the monopoly is q = (q1,...,qn) ∈ Q = Rn, the latter set being
a lattice.16 The function V (·) is deﬁned on this lattice Q, and since we have
assumed that any qi and qj (i 6= j) are strategic complements, it implies that
V (·) is supermodular in q on Q.17




θiV (qi,q)f(θi) − cq. (1)
Since there are no externalities on non-traders, the perfectly discriminating
monopoly internalizes all network eﬀects. Thus the monopoly’s problem is
equivalent to the welfare-maximizing one, and the optimal allocation produces
16A lattice is a partially ordered set, which contains the least upper bound (so called join)
and greatest lower bound (so called meet) of each pair of its elements. The join (meet) of two










17This follows from Theorem 2.6.2. in Topkis (1998). A function g(x) is supermodular on
the lattice X, if g(x0) + g(x00) ≤ g(x0 ∨ x00) + g(x0 ∧ x00) for all (x0,x00) ∈ X.
9no social ineﬃciency. This result is in line with Segal (1999), since so far the
heterogeneity of consumers played no role.
Note that the proﬁt function is the sum of supermodular functions multi-
plied by positive constants, so it will be supermodular on Q.18 In all of this
paper, since we concentrate on the critical assumptions allowing to compare the
ﬁrst- and second best outcomes, we assume that the respective proﬁt function
has a positive bounded maximum, without imposing any suﬃcient conditions
guaranteeing this property.
If we maximize ΠFB in q, the following set of ﬁrst-order conditions charac-




θjV2(qj,q)f(θj) = c, for all i ∈ N. (2)
The ﬁrst term measures the marginal utility of individual consumption for a
consumer of type i, we will call it individual eﬀect. The second term sums the
marginal utility increases of all consumers due to the increased consumption of
consumer group i, which will be called network eﬀect. Note that the network
eﬀects are the same in all equations. If there are no network eﬀects, we are back
to the standard result of ﬁrst-best implementation: individual eﬀect should
equal marginal cost.
By combining two ﬁrst-order conditions, we have that
θiV1(qi,q) = θjV1(qj,q)
for all i,j ∈ N. Since V11 ≤ 0, θi < θj implies qi < qj, so in the ﬁrst-best
optimum consumers of higher types end up with a larger quantity level than
consumers of lower types.
18See Lemma 2.6.1 in Topkis (1998). We use the fact that a one-dimensional function, like
cqi, is both super- and submodular, and a supermodular minus a submodular function is still
supermodular.
19Throughout the whole paper, the ﬁnal forms of the ﬁrst-order conditions are derived after
dividing the equations by the density of the respective type.
104 The second-best optimal contract
If the monopoly should oﬀer the same menu of contracts for all consumers, the
ﬁrst-best optimum is not feasible, since all consumers except of the lowest type
θ1 will have an individual incentive to choose a contract devoted to a lower
consumer type, as in the standard screening model with network eﬀects. An
incentive-compatible menu structure {(qi,ti)}n
i=1 should satisfy participation
constraints (Pi) and the following set of incentive constraints:
θiV (qi,q) − ti ≥ θiV (qj,q) − tj (ICij)
for all i,j ∈ N, where q =
P
i∈N
qif(θi) is the rationally expected equilibrium
network size.
By adding incentive constraints (ICij) and (ICji), we see that
(θi − θj)[V (qi,q) − V (qj,q)] ≥ 0 (3)
should hold for all i,j ∈ N. Since V1 > 0, in order to have an implementable
mechanism, the quantity scheme q(θ)should be a non-decreasing function of the
type. We will refer to this condition as the monotonicity constraint.
The reason why we end up with exactly the same implementability condi-
tions as in the standard screening problem without network eﬀects is because
in the incentive constraints we require only that no consumer has any incentive
to deviate individually from his equilibrium choice. Since we have assumed a
continuum of consumers in each type, a single consumer’s choice cannot have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on network size, so q remains unchanged if other consumers
stick to their equilibrium choice.
As standard in incentive theory literature, we ﬁrst analyze the set of con-
straints to ﬁnd the relevant ones.
11Lemma 1 In the second-best optimum there are n binding constraints: (P1),
the participation constraint of the lowest-type consumer, and (ICi(i−1)) for
i = 2,...,n, the downward local incentive constraints. Furthermore, the opti-
mal tariﬀs are
t1 = θ1V (q1,q), and
ti = θiV (qi,q) −
i−1 X
j=1
∆θjV (qj,q), for i = 2,...,n,
where ∆θj = θj+1 − θj.
Proof. See Appendix A.
These tariﬀ equations demonstrate the standard intuition of second-degree
discrimination: the surplus of the lowest type consumers is fully grasped, while




order to satisfy incentive compatibility.
By substituting the optimal tariﬀ functions into the proﬁt function, it sim-
pliﬁes to the following form:20


















V (qi,q)f(θi) − cq. (4)
The function ΠSB should be maximized in q, with respect to the monotonic-
ity constraint (3) and q ≥ 0. We ignore these constraints for the moment, and
check at the end whether they are satisﬁed in equilibrium. Then the optimal











∆θj [1 − F(θj)]V2(qj,q) = c, for all i ∈ N. (5)
20This simpliﬁed form contains a non-deﬁned type parameter, θn+1 in ∆θn. However, it
does not play any role, since it is multiplied by 1 − F(θn) = 0.
12The ﬁrst term is the ﬁrst-best individual eﬀect, while the second is the
ﬁrst-best network eﬀect. The third subtracted term will be called second-best
individual eﬀect, and this has exactly the same form as in the standard screening
model without network eﬀects. This eﬀect equals zero for consumers of type θn,
so produces ‘no distortion at the top’, and is positive for all other types.
However, there is the ﬁnal sum to be subtracted, which will be called second-
best network eﬀect, and is strictly positive for all consumers. The presence of a
second-best term in the optimum condition for the highest type consumers is due
to the fact that now all types’ information rent is aﬀected by total network size
q as well, which contains qn, while in standard incentive theory the information
rent of the ith type depends only on qi−1. Its emergence already foreshadows
the result that in the presence of network eﬀects the ‘no distortion at the top’
result will no longer hold.
Since the network eﬀects are the same in all ﬁrst-order conditions, combining













for all i,j ∈ N. Now let us examine the implications of the omitted constraints.
First, θi − ∆θi
1−F(θi)
f(θi) should be positive for all consumers supplied with
a positive quantity, since θn − ∆θn
1−F(θn)
f(θn) = θn and V1 are both positive. If
θi −∆θi
1−F(θi)
f(θi) ≤ 0, the ith type (and by the monotonicity constraint all lower
types) will be shut down, so qi = 0. Note that no shut-down condition has the
same form as in the classical screening literature without network eﬀects.
Second, since V11 ≤ 0, in order to satisfy the monotonicity constraint, θi −
∆θi
1−F(θi)
f(θi) > θj − ∆θj
1−F(θi)
f(θi) should be satisﬁed for i > j, if the monopoly
wants to separate type-i and type-j consumers. If θi − ∆θi
1−F(θi)
f(θi) ≤ θj −
∆θj
1−F(θi)
f(θi) , the two types will be bunched, that is qi = qj. A possible suﬃcient
condition to avoid bunching is that ∆θi is the same for all i and F(θ) satisﬁes







In the following discussion we assume that in the optimal mechanism at least
two diﬀerent types are served and discriminated.
135 Comparison of diﬀerent outcomes
We have derived the ﬁrst-order conditions for the perfect (ﬁrst-degree) and
incentive (second-best) discrimination cases, which characterize the equilibrium
quantities, and thereby the equilibrium tariﬀs in the respective regimes. We
have seen that in the second-best case the presence of network eﬀects distorts
the ﬁrst-best allocations for all consumers. In the next proposition we prove
that this is a strict downward distortion for all consumers.
Instead of solving these equation systems and comparing directly the equilib-
rium allocations, we develop a parametrized functional form that encompasses
both regimes as optimal solutions for diﬀerent parameter values, and then use
monotone comparative statics tools to show that the optimal solution is a strictly
monotone function of this parameter. Note that the original Monotone Selection
Theorem derived by Milgrom and Shannon (1994, Theorem 4’) shows that the
conditions under which the set of maximizers of a supermodular function is only
non-decreasing in response to an exogenous parameter. By arguing from ﬁrst-
order conditions, Edlin and Shannon (1998) extend this result by showing that
under some conditions the maximizer should be strictly increasing in at least
one dimension. Our next lemma builds on their result by identifying a suﬃcient
condition so that the maximizer is strictly increasing in all dimensions.
Lemma 2 Let Q = Rn and T = R, and let f : Q × T → R be a continuously
diﬀerentiable function, which is supermodular in q on Q, and has strictly in-
creasing diﬀerences in (q,t) on Q × T. Furthermore, suppose that f(q,t) has
increasing marginal returns for all choice variables, that is ∂
2Π
∂qi∂t > 0 for all qi.
Let q(t) ∈ argmax
q∈Q
Π(q,t). Then q(t00) > q(t0) if t00 > t0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Armed with this lemma, we are able to give a simple proof for our main
theorem.
14Proposition 3 The second-best allocation is strictly smaller than the ﬁrst best
allocation, that is qSB < qFB.
Proof. Consider only the types that are not shut down in the second-best regime
(set S), since for the others the strict downward distortion holds trivially. Let









V (qi,q)f(θi) − cq,
where T = [−1,0]. When α = 0, we have the ﬁrst-best proﬁt function given
in (1), while for α = −1 we have the second-best proﬁt function given in (4).
Then the function Π(q,α) is supermodular in q on Q for all α, since by the no
shut-down condition the multipliers of V (·) are always positive for all i ∈ S.
Moreover, Π(q,α) has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (q,α) on Q × T, and
the marginal returns of all qi-s are increasing in α, since ∂
2Π
∂qi∂α > 0 for all qi.
Therefore, since αFB > αSB, Lemma 2 ensures that q(αFB) > q(αSB).
Second, we compare the equilibrium allocations of ﬁrst- and second-best
discrimination regimes to the perfectly competitive case, where identical ﬁrms
supply the network good at a price equal to marginal cost c. Then each consumer
of type θi derives a utility of
θiV (qi,qPC) − cqi,
where qPC is the expected network size under perfect competition, which should
be fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
Maximizing utility in qi results in the ﬁrst-order condition of
θiV1(qi,qPC) = c, for all i ∈ N. (6)
Let us denote the solution of this equation system by qPC. By combining two
ﬁrst-order conditions, we see that qPC
i > qPC
j if θi > θj.
15Proposition 4 The equilibrium allocation under perfect competition is strictly
smaller than in the ﬁrst-best discrimination case, that is qPC < qFB.
Proof. If we compare ﬁrst-order conditions (6) with the ﬁrst-order conditions
(2) of the ﬁrst-best discrimination case , we see that
θiV1(qFB
i ,qFB) < θiV1(qPC
i ,qPC)
for all i ∈ N. In the ﬁrst-best case, the monopoly is supplying the welfare-
maximizing allocation, so qFB cannot be smaller than qPC, since the externali-
ties are positive. Then since V12 ≥ 0, for all qFB
i
V1(qFB
i ,qPC) ≤ V1(qFB
i ,qFB).
Combining this inequality with the former one, we have that
θiV1(qFB
i ,qPC) < θiV1(qPC
i ,qPC),
which yields that qFB
i > qPC
i for all i ∈ N, since V11 ≤ 0.
Thus, the perfectly competitive outcome is smaller than the ﬁrst-best dis-
crimination outcome. This is because perfectly competitive ﬁrms cannot in-
ternalize the network eﬀects implied by larger allocations, since they cannot
inﬂuence the quantity choice of the consumers. On the other hand, the per-
fectly discriminating monopoly can set the (larger) socially optimal allocation,
and reap the increased surplus of each consumer.
The comparison of the allocations under second-best discrimination and per-
fect competition (deﬁned by equations (5) and (6)) does not give unambiguous
results, since we are comparing two outcomes, which fail to be the ﬁrst-best for
two diﬀerent reasons: incentive problems due to information asymmetry and
the incapability of internalizing network eﬀects. However, if the impact of net-
work eﬀects is large enough to oﬀset the eﬀect due to the decrease in individual
consumption (loosely speaking, if V2 is suﬃciently larger than ∆θi
1−F(θi)
f(θi) V1),
then we may have a larger allocation in the screening monopoly regime than
under perfect competition.
16Last, we show that the equilibrium outcome is a strictly increasing function
of the intensity of the network eﬀects, no matter which type of discrimination
we consider. As a corollary, we can state that discrimination in the presence of
network eﬀects always leads to a larger allocation than in the standard screening
case (i.e. without network eﬀects). This result is natural in the case of ﬁrst-best
discrimination, but it also shows that despite the downward distorting factor
from the ﬁrst-best allocation, the presence of network eﬀects has a positive
impact in total on the resulting allocation in the second-best case as well.
Let us consider the utility function U(θi) = θiV (qi,βq) − ti, where β ≥ 0
measures the intensity of network size. If β = 0, we are back to the standard
discrimination case without positive network eﬀects, while our original model
refers to β = 1.
Proposition 5 Both for ﬁrst- and second-best discrimination in the presence of
network eﬀects, the equilibrium allocation q(β) is a strictly increasing function
of β for the types supplied with positive quantities.
Proof. The set of types supplied with positive quantities is N in the ﬁrst-best
regime and S for the second-best regime, where S is deﬁned by the same no
shut-down condition for any network size intensity. The proﬁt function takes







V (qi,βq)f(θi) − cq,
where β ∈ T = R+. The higher index j shows whether we are in the ﬁrst- or
second-best regime, so αFB = 0,αSB = −1. We have seen that the function
Πj(q,β) is supermodular in q on Q for each β and j. Now Πj(q,β) has strictly
increasing diﬀerences in (q,β) only on Q × (T \ {0}), so applying Lemma 2
shows only that q(β) is strictly increasing for β ∈ (0,∞). However, the Mono-
tone Comparative Statics Theorem guarantees the smallest elements of q(β) is
increasing on the whole T, and if there exists a suﬃciently small β
0 > 0 such
that the smallest element of q(β
0) equals the unique q(0), then q(β
0/2) < q(0),
which is a contradiction. Therefore q(β) should be strictly increasing on T.
176 Discussion of the continuous-type case
In the screening literature it is common to discuss the models in a continuous-
type framework, since it simpliﬁes considerably the exposition of the imple-
mentation problem.21 Indeed, the description of ﬁrst- and second best optimal
contracts presented in Section 3 and 4 can be easily modiﬁed to account for
a continuum of types, and the characterizing conditions will have exactly the
same form stated in integrals instead of sums. In this case, however, deﬁning
strategic complementarity and proving the supermodularity of the general proﬁt
function, which is the key for the monotone comparative statics results of Sec-
tion 5, is not straightforward. In this section we brieﬂy sketch the analysis and
the arising diﬃculties, which leads to slightly weaker results.
Suppose now that θ is distributed on [θ,θ] according to a continuous dis-
tribution function F(θ), with a positive density f(θ) at each point. As in the
discrete-type case, the relevant decision variables are the quantity choices of
the monopoly, since the optimal tariﬀ schedule t(θ) will be determined by the
optimal quantity schedule q(θ). Now let Q be the set of bounded, piecewise con-
tinuous functions q(θ) deﬁned on [θ,θ], and the join and meet of two elements
q0(θ) and q00(θ) are deﬁned as the upper and lower envelope of the two functions:
q0(θ) ∨ q00(θ) = max{q0(θ),q00(θ)} and q0(θ) ∧ q00(θ) = min{q0(θ),q00(θ)}. Then
Q is a lattice, since it always contains the join and meet of any two elements.
So far in our model we have been working with a discrete distribution of
types, that is F(θ) was an n-step function where the interval of possible types
was divided into n partitions. Let us call this partitioning Ωn, and take ﬁner and
ﬁner partitions by increasing n towards inﬁnity in such a way that Ωn uniformly
converges to Ω characterized by the continuous distribution function F(θ). We
have seen that for any ﬁnite n, the Ωn partitioning of the type space yielded a
supermodular objective function Π(q) in q on Rn, and now we show that this
property holds in the limit on the lattice Q deﬁned above.
21See for example Section 7.3 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Appendix 3.1 of Laﬀont
and Martimort (2002).
18Lemma 6 If Π(q) is supermodular in q on Q for all ﬁnite Ωn partitioning of
the type space, then Π(q(θ)) will be supermodular in q(θ) on Q.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Given this property, we can use the Monotone Selection Theorem to show
that qSB(θ) ≤ qFB(θ). Note that we can show only the downward distortion
result, but not in the strict sense. The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the ﬁnite
dimension of the choice space, and by using the result that network size should
decrease under second-degree discrimination, we can only show that qSB(θ) is
strictly smaller than qFB(θ) for a set of positive measure.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have derived a general model to analyze the second-degree price
discrimination problem of a monopoly selling a network good exhibiting strate-
gic complementarities. By using the tools of monotone comparative statics, we
were able to give a full characterization of screening contracts. We have seen
that strategic complementarities and asymmetric information together lead to
a strict downward distortion for all consumers, and the equilibrium outcome is
an increasing function of the intensity of the network eﬀects. Additionally, we
have shown that a discriminating monopoly may supply larger quantities for all
consumers than a perfectly competitive industry.
A crucial feature of our model was that the optimal contracts are designed
such that it is individually not proﬁtable for deviating from the truthtelling
equilibrium. However, the natural question arises whether it could be advanta-
geous for some consumers to form a coalition to coordinate their decisions and
then reallocate the goods among themselves. Jeon and Menicucci (2002) show
that there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to contracts that
satisfy only individually incentive compatibility constraints, if the coalitions are
formed under asymmetric information. This is because buyers fail to realize the
gains from joint deviations due to the transaction costs of asymmetric informa-
19tion among themselves, and the monopoly can use this fact to construct a menu
of contracts, by which it can do at least as well as when there is no coalition.
Although network eﬀects are not present in their model, the intuition seems to
hold in our setting as well.
In the whole paper the network goods provided to diﬀerent types of con-
sumers were assumed to be compatible with each other. Let us brieﬂy discuss
the case of two types where the monopoly chooses the network good provided
to low-type consumers to be incompatible with the high-types’ goods, while the
high-types’s good has full compatibility. Now low-types beneﬁt less from the
network, so the monopoly cannot charge such a high tariﬀ for them. However,
a high-type consumer will now have less incentive to choose the menu devoted
to low-type consumers, since then he excludes himself from using a part of the
network, so information rent of high-type consumers should decrease as well,
which is proﬁtable for the monopoly. Therefore, it is a natural conjecture that
if the monopoly chooses to make its good partially incompatible, then it will
choose to do so with the good devoted to low-type consumers, since high-type
consumers have a higher marginal utility for the network.
If the good devoted to low-type consumers is incompatible with the good de-
voted to high-type consumers, then in equilibrium low-type consumers’ utilities
depend only on low-type consumers’ choices. This is exactly the same case as if
low-type consumers had the pessimistic expectation that high-type consumers
will stay out of the market, so the monopoly has to design the contract devoted
to low-type consumers such that they would accept it ‘without the high-types’
as well. But if high-type consumers observe the contract devoted to low-type
consumers, no matter how pessimistic prior expectations they had about low-
types’ behavior, they will realize that low-types will accept that contract in
any case. Then they will make their choices by expecting low-type ones ‘in the
network’, thus the monopoly can design the menu devoted to high-types accord-
ingly. This “divide-and-conquer” strategy, presented also in Jullien (2002) and
Segal (2003), may help to overcome the problem of multiple equilibria induced
by diﬀerent consumers’ expectations and to end up with unique implementation.
208 Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
First, the participation constraint (Pi) will be automatically satisﬁed for all
types i ≥ 2 if the constraints (P1) and (ICi1) are satisﬁed, since
θiV (qi,q) − ti ≥ θiV (q1,q) − t1 > θ1V (q1,q) − t1 ≥ 0.
Second, by adding any two incentive constraints (ICij) and (ICjk) such that
i > j > k, we have
θiV (qi,q) − ti ≥ (θi − θj)V (qj,q) + θjV (qk,q) − tk.
Rearranging the monotonicity constraint (3) gives (θi − θj)V (qj,q)+θjV (qk,q) ≥
θiV (qk,q). Therefore
θiV (qi,q) − ti ≥ θiV (qk,q) − tk,
so the incentive constraint (ICik) is satisﬁed. The same reasoning can be done
for the case of i < j < k, thus the local incentive constraints (the ones involving
adjacent types) imply the global incentive constraints.
Now suppose that (ICij) for i < j will not be binding in equilibrium, so
we ignore them for the moment and check later whether they will be satisﬁed.
Then the remaining n constraints constraints should be binding in equilibrium,
implying the optimal tariﬀ functions (t1)−(tn). Finally, by substituting the cor-
responding tariﬀ functions into the ignored upward local incentive constraints,
we see that they are indeed satisﬁed if
∆θi−1[V (qi,q) − V (qi−1,q)] ≥ 0, for i = 2,...,n,
which is fulﬁlled by the monotonicity constraint (3).
21B Proof of Lemma 2
For any selections from this set of maximizers, the Monotone Selection Theorem
ensures that q(t00) ≥ q(t0) if t00 > t0, and from Theorem 3 of Edlin and Shannon
(1998) we also know that q(t00) 6= q(t0), so they are diﬀerent in at least one
coordinates of Rn.
Now let us assume indirectly that q(t00) is identical to q(t0) in 0 < k < n
coordinates, and they diﬀer in the remaining l = n − k coordinates. We may
assume without any loss of generality that the matching coordinates are the
ﬁrst k ones, so q(t00) = (q00
k,q00







Now pin down the last l coordinates to q0




l,t00) be denoted by q∗
k. By deﬁnition qk(q0
l,t0) = q0
k, and by replicating
the arguments given above, we see that q∗
k cannot be smaller than q0
k, and
diﬀers from q0
k in at least one coordinate. Based on these points, we can deﬁne
q∗ = (q∗
k,q0
l) and q∗∗ = (q∗
k,q00
l ), and then q(t00) ∨ q∗ = q∗∗ and q(t00) ∧ q∗ =
q(t0). Basically we are constructing a rectangle characterized by the points
q(t0),q(t00),q∗ and q∗∗.
The supermodularity on Q ensures that
f(q(t00),t00) + f(q∗,t00) ≤ f(q∗∗,t00) + f(q(t0),t00),
and f(q(t0),t00) < f(q∗,t00) by the deﬁnition of q∗. These two conditions imply
that f(q∗∗,t00) should be strictly larger than f(q(t00),t00), which contradicts the
indirect assumption that the optimal solution q(t00) is identical to q(t0) in the
ﬁrst k coordinates. This method can be applied for any positive k (since the
marginal returns of all qi-s are increasing), so after n−1 steps we can conclude
that q(t00) should diﬀer from q(t0) in all coordinates.
22C Proof of Lemma 6
For any Ωn partitioning, by the supermodularity of the function Π(q) we have
Π(q0) + Π(q00) ≤ Π(q0 ∨ q00) + Π(q0 ∧ q00)









n}). Note that each n-dimension vector
q can be represented by an n-step function qn(θ), so the previous inequality can























n(θ) = q00(θ). Then by the continuity of the proﬁt function,
lim
n→∞Π(q0
n(θ)) = Π(q0(θ)) and lim
n→∞Π(q00
n(θ)) = Π(q00(θ)).
Now for any  > 0 there exists a high enough n such that |q0
n(θ) − q0(θ)| ≤ 
and |q00
n(θ) − q00(θ)| ≤ , that is q0(θ) −  ≤ q0
n ≤ q0(θ) +  and q00(θ) −  ≤ q00
n ≤
q00(θ) +  for each θ ∈ [θ,θ]. Therefore,
max{q0(θ),q00(θ)} −  ≤ max{q0
n(θ),q00
n(θ)} ≤ max{q0(θ),q00(θ)} + ,
so |max{q0
n(θ),q00
n(θ)} − max{q0(θ),q00(θ)}| ≤  for each θ ∈ [θ,θ]. The similar
argument can be replicated for the minimum operator, so we have that the
functional limit of the upper (lower) envelope of the two functions is the upper
(lower) envelope of the functional limits of the two functions.









n(θ)) = Π(q0(θ) ∧ q00(θ)). Therefore, by taking the limits of
inequality (7), we have
Π(q0(θ)) + Π(q00(θ)) ≤ Π(q0(θ) ∨ q00(θ)) + Π(q0(θ) ∧ q00(θ)).
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